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THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT: ARE DEFENDANTS'
RIGHTS VIOLATED WHEN MAGISTRATES
PRESIDE OVER JURY SELECTION
IN FELONY CASES?
INTRODUCTION

In 1968, Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act' in response to
the rapidly expanding caseload of the federal courts.2 The Act permits
district judges to delegate to magistrates certain duties,3 including trying

petty criminal offenses, 4 conducting pretrial and discovery proceedings, 5
and considering preliminary petitions for post-trial relief.6 In addition to
enumerating the express powers and responsibilities of magistrates, the
Act also contains an additional duties clause.' The clause enables a dis-

trict judge to assign magistrates "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.""

One of the issues that has arisen under the clause is whether federal
magistrates may preside over jury selection in felony cases. This dispute
occurs on two levels. First, because the Act does not specifically enumer-

ate this function, courts disagree whether the additional duties clause all.Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(1982)).
2. See H.R Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4252, 4254-55; H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6162, 6164; United States v. Schronce,
727 F.2d 91, 93 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677
F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc); Note, Is the Federal Magistrate Act
Constitutional After Northern Pipeline?, 1985 Ariz. St. L.J. 189, 189; Note, The Expanding Influence of the FederalMagistrate, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev. 465, 465 (1981).
3. Once Congress allows a delegation, the courts formulate their own rules governing procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (1982). See, e.g., Fed. F_ Civ. P. 72; D.NJ.
R. 40; E.D.N.Y. Mag. R. 1-15; N.D.N.Y. R. 44; S.D.N.Y. Mag. R. 1-15; W.D.N.Y. R.
35-36. These rules have the "force of law" as long as they do not conflict with the Constitution, Supreme Court rules, or congressional enactments. See Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S.
160, 169 (1929); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d 111, 112 (2d Cir. 1984).
The rules concerning magistrates closely follow the Act which instructs the magistrate to
submit his or her proposed findings or recommendations to the court and to all concerned
parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982) ("A judge of the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.
The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate
with instructions.").
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (magistrates have "the power to conduct trials under
section 3401, title 18, United States Code" with defendant's consent).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) ("[A] judge may designate a magistrate to hear and
determine any pretrial matter pending before the court.").
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982) ("[A] judge may also designate a magistrate
to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings.... of applications for posttrial [sic]
relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.") (footnote omitted).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1982).
8.Id.
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lows a district judge to delegate jury selection to magistrates.9 Second,
controversy exists over whether such a delegation is constitutional."°
In United States v. Raddatz,1 1 the Supreme Court set forth a general

approach to follow when determining whether a district judge may delegate responsibility to a magistrate under the Act.12 Although the claim3
in Raddatz involved a delegation expressly provided for by the Act,'
courts have used the Raddatz approach to determine whether a district
judge may delegate other powers under the additional duties clause.' 4

This Note examines whether district judges may delegate jury selection
to magistrates. Applying the Raddatz approach, this Note concludes
that a district judge may delegate the duty of presiding over jury selection to a magistrate under the additional duties clause and that this delegation is consistent with the Constitution.
9. Compare United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (9th Cir.) (udges may
delegate jury selection in felony cases to magistrates), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985)
and United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 872-73 (1st Cir. 1983) (additional duties
clause should be broadly construed to include jury selection in felony cases) with United
States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Congress did not intend to
include jury selection in felony cases as an additional duty), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741
(1988).
10. Some courts hold that because de novo review by an Article III judge always is
available, the Constitution permits the delegation of jury selection in felony cases to magistrates. See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001-03 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1063 (1986); accord United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). One court holds that the de novo review available does
not sufficiently protect defendant's due process rights and, therefore, the Constitution
does not allow this delegation. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988). Ford also holds that such a delegation
violates Article III as well. Id. at 1435; See infra notes 40-104 and accompanying text.
11. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
12. See id. at 676, 680-81. In Raddatz, the Court held that a district judge may delegate his or her authority to conduct suppression hearings to magistrates under the Act
without violating the Constitution because an Article III judge always retains the power
to institute a de novo review of the magistrate's actions. Id. at 680-81. The Court's
approach in Raddatz stemmed from its decision in Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261
(1976), see Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 682-83, in which it held that a delegation to a magistrate
under the additional duties clause to review an administrative determination of defendant's entitlement to social security benefits does not violate the Constitution as long as the
final decision is made by an Article III judge. 423 U.S. at 270-72.
13. The respondent in Raddatz challenged the magistrate's authority to preside over a
suppression hearing. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 677. The Act expressly provides for such
delegation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982).
14. Courts either have applied Raddatz, which is based on Mathews v. Weber, see
supra note 12 and accompanying text, or they have applied Weber directly. See, e.g.,
United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 662-64 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Raddatz to
whether magistrates may preside over jury deliberations), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981); United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 55-56 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Mathews to whether magistrates may enforce Internal Revenue Service summons).
Courts that have addressed whether district judges may refer jury selection in felony
cases to magistrates have relied on Raddatz. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430,
1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985).
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DISCUSSION

In United States v. Raddatz,15 the Supreme Court analyzed whether a

district judge may refer a motion for an evidentiary hearing to a magis-

trate under section 636(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Magistrates Act. 6 The

Supreme Court set forth a general approach for determining whether a
district judge may delegate other duties to magistrates under the Act."

Although section 636(b)(1)(B) specifically provides that magistrates may

hear evidentiary motions,18 the Court's approach in Raddatz is applicable to other sections of the Act, including the additional duties clause.' 9
A.

Statutory Analysis

Under Raddatz, a court first must determine whether the Federal
Magistrates Act authorizes the delegation of a particular duty to magis-

trates2 ---here, jury selection in felony cases. Accordingly, it must ex-

amine the legislative history surrounding the Act to determine whether
this referral comports with congressional intent.2
Despite the concerns raised by some courts and litigants, a district
judge may delegate the duty of presiding over jury selection in a felony

case to a magistrate under the additional duties clause of the Act.'
15. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
16. In Raddatz, the respondent moved to suppress incriminating statements he had
made to federal agents. Id at 669. Over defendant's objections, the district judge directed a magistrate to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Idt
17. See id. at 676, 680-81; infra notes 20 and 35 and accompanying text.
18. The Act states that "a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings,
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of
fact and recommendations for the disposition." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982).
19. District courts have applied Raddatz to determine whether district judges may
delegate responsibilities to magistrates under the additional duties clause of the Act. See
supra note 14 and accompanying text. For decisions applying Raddatz to the delegation
of duties expressly stated in the Act, see for example, Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d
1505, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (delegation of a hearing for habeas corpus
petition); Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1085 (3d Cir. 1983) (same).
20. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980).
21. See iL at 674-75. In Raddatz, the respondent argued that the Act required the
district judge to rehear all of the testimony that was presented to the magistrate during
the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. See id. at 673. The Court disposed of
this contention with relative ease because § 636(b)(1)(B) of the Act provides that a district judge may "designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations
for the disposition ...of [the] motion." Id at 673 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)).
Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court explained that the district judge need not
rehear the disputed testimony because the Act requires "a de noro determination, not a de
novo hearing." Id at 674 (emphasis in original). The Court explained that it found
"nothing in the legislative history of the statute to support the contention that the judge is
required to rehear the contested testimony in order to carry out the statutory command
to make the required 'determination.'" Id
22. See United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 474
U.S. 847 (1985); United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001-03 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 872-74 (lst Cir.
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Although the Act does not list jury selection as an expressly delegable
duty, 3 the legislative history surrounding the Act indicates that delegation of this responsibility meets with congressional intent.
In 1968, when it first enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, Congress
suggested three functions that district judges might refer to magistrates

under the additional duties clause.24 Congress, however, did not intend

to limit responsibilities that could be delegated under the clause to its

suggestions;2 5 rather it hoped that district judges also would utilize magistrates in other areas the 2judges
might deem necessary "to increase the
6
efficiency of their courts."
In 1976, in response to judicial misinterpretation,27 Congress amended
the Federal Magistrates Act 2 8 to include hearing and determining pretrial matters 29 and conducting evidentiary hearings3" among the express
duties that district judges may delegate to magistrates. At the time of
amendment, Congress indicated its intent that the additional duties
clause be construed broadly. 3 Congress also placed this clause in an
1983). But see United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988).
23. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982).
24. See Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107, 1113 (1968) (amended 1976). These three
suggestions were: "(1) service as a special master... ; (2) assistance to a district judge in
the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and (3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial [sic] relief .... ." Id.
25. See Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1968) (statement of Sen. Tydings, sponsor of the bill and Chairman of the Senate's Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery) ("The Magistrate [sic] Act specifies these three areas because they
came up in our hearings and we thought they were areas in which the district courts
might be able to benefit from the magistrate's services. We did not limit the courts to the
areas mentioned.").
26. See id.
27. The legislative history surrounding the amendment shows that Congress acted in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). See
H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 6162, 6164-65. In Wingo, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Magistrates
Act did not authorize the referral to magistrates of evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus
proceedings because Congress did not intend to authorize this delegation. See Wingo,
418 U.S. at 470. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger suggested "now that the Court has
construed the Magistrates Act contrary to a clear legislative intent, it is for the Congress
to act to restate its intentions if its declared objectives are to be carried out." Id. at 487.
28. See Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631639 (1982)).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982).
31. See H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 6162, 6165. The House Report states:
[T]he magistrate should be a judicial officer whose purpose [is] to assist the
district judge to the end that the district judge could have more time to preside
at the trial of cases having been relieved of part of his duties which required the
judge to personally hear each and every pretrial motion or proceeding necessary
to prepare a case for trial.
Id. at 6166. The additional duties clause "enables the district courts to continue innovative experimentations in the use of this judicial officer." Id. at 6172.

1988]

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT

entirely separate subsection of the statute to emphasize that "it is not
restricted in any way by any other specific grant of authority to
magistrates."3 2
Relying on the legislative history of the additional duties clause, courts
have found that district judges may delegate to magistrates many duties
not specifically enumerated in the Act. 33 A majority of the courts of
appeals that have addressed whether district judges may delegate jury
selection in felony cases to magistrates have found this delegation to be
among these additional duties.34 These courts have construed the Act
broadly and have relied on a constitutional analysis to determine whether
the district judge may delegate the responsibility.
32. Id at 6172.

33. See, eg., Mathews v. Weber. 423 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1976) (magistrate may review
an administrative determination regarding the right to receive social security benefits);
United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 662-64 (9th Cir. 1980) (magistrate may instruct
jury to continue deliberations in district judge's absence), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981); United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 55-56 (10th Cir. 1980) (magistrate may enforce Internal Revenue Service summons); United States v. Boswell, 565
F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (5th Cir.) (magistrate may preside over closing argument), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819 (1978).
34. See United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (9th Cir.) (district judges
may delegate jury selection to magistrates even if defendant objects to the delegation),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985); United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001-03 (9th
Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713
F.2d 866, 872 (1st Cir. 1983) (upholding delegation of voir dire to a magistrate on theory
that defendant waived his right to an Article III judge by failing to object at trial and
implying it would uphold this delegation even if there had been no waiver); see also
United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendant's failure to
object to magistrate presiding over jury selection is not reversible error), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 906 (1984); cf Haith v. United States, 342 F.2d 158, 159 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(judge's absence from the court room during jury selection does not constitute reversible
error when defendant fails to object).
Moreover, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has interpreted the
Act to include jury selection as a delegable duty. See Legal Manual for United States
Magistrates § 3.09(2) (1983). Thus, the local rules in a number of districts authorize the
district judges to assign jury selection to magistrates in both civil and criminal cases. See.
e.g., D. Ariz. R. 18(d)(6); M.D. Fla. R. 6.01(c)(20); N.D. Fla. R. 24 (J)( 2 )(c)(1); D.P.R.
R. 506.6. Other courts allow the delegation of jury selection but do not specify whether
they are referring to civil or criminal cases. See, eg., N.D. Ala. Mag. R. 4(f); S.D. Ala.
R. 26(l)(i)(6); N.D. Cal. R. 405(g); S.D. Cal. R. 501-8(f); D. Del. Mag. R. l(i)(6);
D.D.C. R. 501(b)(6); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. l(i)(6); D. Haw. R. 401-8(f); C.D. Ill. R.
3(A)(14); S.D. Ill. R. 29(i)(6); N.D. Ind. Mag. R. l(i)(9); N.D. Iowa R. 4.1.94; S.D. Iowa
R. 4.1.94; D. Kan. R. 36(9)(f); E.D. La. R. 20.7(f); M.D. La. R. 26(i)(5); W.D. La. R.
28(a)(9)(e); W.D. Mich. Mag. R. I(H)(5); D. Minn. R. 16 (E)(5); D. Neb. R. 44(I)(6);
D.N.H. Mag. R. D(3); E.D.N.Y. R. 25.1 Mag. R. 5(e); N.D.N.Y. R. 43.5(A)(3);
E.D.N.C. R. 62.09(f); M.D.N.C. R. 401(b)(4); D.N.D. R. 28(c)(4); N.D. Ohio R.
19.10(2); E.D. Pa. R. 7(I)(i)(6); M.D. Pa. R. 901.9(a)(7); W.D. Pa. Mag. R. 6(e); D.R.I.
R. 32(e)(5); M.D. Tenn. R. 601(a)(2); W.D. Tenn. R. 17(I)(i)(6); W.D. Wash. Mag. R.

9(d); N.D. W.Va. R. 4.01(i)(6); S.D. W.Va. Mag. R. l(i)(6); ED. Wisc. 13.06(d).
Only the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holds that Congress did not intend to
authorize the delegation of jury selection in felony cases to magistrates. See United States
v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988).
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ConstitutionalAnalysis

The next step in applying Raddatz requires the court to determine
whether the Constitution permits the delegation to magistrates.3 5 This

part of the analysis has two components. The first component addresses
the preservation of the separation of powers among the three branches of

the federal government: 36 courts must determine whether delegation to
magistrates of jury selection in felony cases violates Article III by allowing magistrates to exercise powers reserved to Article III judges."
The second component addresses the defendant's fifth amendment due

process rights.3" Courts must determine whether delegation of jury se-

lection preserves the defendant's access to an independent federal judiciary that acts to protect his personal liberties. 39 The delegation by a

district judge to a magistrate must satisfy both components of the analysis to pass constitutional muster.
1. Separation of Powers
Delegating jury selection in felony cases to magistrates does not in-

fringe upon the judicial power of the United States, which is governed by
Article III of the Constitution.' Therefore, it accords with the separation of powers between the three branches of the federal government.

The United States Constitution allocates the three basic political pow-

ers-legislative, 4 ' executive,42 and judicia143 -to three separate branches
of the federal government. Believing that the concentration of power in
any one entity inevitably threatens liberty," the framers of the Constitu35. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980). The additional duties
clause allows district judges to delegate responsibilities to magistrates as long as the delegation does not violate the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1982).
36. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-84; infra notes 40-86 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1434-35 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). Article III judges are those judges appointed
under Article III of the Constitution and possess the attributes described therein. For
further discussion of the requirements of Article III see infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
38. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 677-81; infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text. The
fifth amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988); United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1027 (1986). Adjudication by an Article III judge is a
personal right belonging to individual defendants, as well as a function of separation of
powers. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536-37 (1962); Kaufman, Chilling
JudicialIndependence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 684, 689 (1979).
40. See U.S. Const. art. III.
41. See U.S. Const. art. I.
42. See U.S. Const. art. II.
43. See U.S. Const. art. III.
44. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, at
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tion structured the government so that no single branch could exercise
all powers.4' Therefore, the framers created an interdependent, tripartite
system in which each institution both exercises its own powers46 and
checks those of the other two branches.47
This system was erected, not to protect the liberties of individual defendants, but rather to protect the populace as a whole from tyrannical
government.48 Because separation of powers is not an individual right,
waiver is impossible.49 Consent of an individual defendant, therefore,
cannot cure a violation of this constitutional mandate."
In accordance with the separation of powers, the Constitution clearly
establishes that the "judicial power of the United States"5" must be exercised by an independent judiciary and provides safeguards to protect this
independence. 52 Article III of the Constitution sets forth the powers that
belong exclusively to the judicial branch of the federal government 53 and
vests these powers in judges who must receive life tenure and an un319 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898); see The Federalist No. 79, at 527 (A. Hamilton) (P.
Ford ed. 1898); Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 371, 37377 (1976).
45. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
46. The legislative branch makes the laws, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, the executive
branch administers the laws, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, and the judicial branch adjudicates the laws, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. No branch may exercise powers belonging to
another. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
123 (1976) (per curiam).
47. The President has veto power over proposed legislation, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 7,
a check on the lawmaking power of the legislative branch. The legislature has the power
to impeach, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 4, a check on the executive branch. The judiciary
has the power to interpret laws, a check on both the legislative and executive branches.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. "The doctrine of the separation of
powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787... to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power.... [and] to save the people from autocracy." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
49. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Schor, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3257-58
(1987).
50. See Id.; Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (7th
Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537,
544 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); cf United States v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 226, 229 (1938) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties'
consent).
51. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
52. See id.
53. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of
another State;--between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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diminishable salary.54 The framers believed that vesting the federal gov-

ernment's powers in judges who possess these attributes would ensure the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary." Moreover, they felt
these protections would promote public confidence in judicial determinations 56 and attract well-qualified people to the federal bench.", These

provisions also insulate judges from influences of other branches and colleagues,5 and promote judicial individualism.59

Although magistrates possess neither life tenure6° nor an undiminish-

able salary, 6 1 the Federal Magistrates Act allows district judges to delegate many judicial functions to them. 62 Relying on the additional duties

clause of the Act, the majority of the courts of appeals that have ad54. Article III, § 1 of the Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "good Behaviour" to mean that judges
will enjoy life tenure and can be removed only by impeachment. See United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955); Kaufman, supra note 39, at 691-92. Similarly,
the Court has interpreted the term "fixed compensation" to mean that Article III judges
must receive a fixed salary that cannot be reduced during their term in office. See United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1980).
55. "[Tenure is] the best expedient... to secure steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws." The Federalist No. 78, at 518 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
"Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human
nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." The Federalist
No. 79, at 527 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898) (emphasis in original).
56. Because "the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments," The Federalist No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898), the public needs to know that the judges will uphold their
responsibilibties. Id. Life tenure and an undiminishable salary, therefore, are "essential
to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty," id., because they allow judges to question Congress without the fear of losing their livelihoods. Id.
57. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1980); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S.
245, 253 (1920). Temporary appointments would discourage the most qualified candidates from leaving a lucrative practice for a job with no future. See The Federalist No.
78, at 526 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
58. See Kaufman, supra note 39, at 713.
59. Id. Judicial individualism allows the judicial branch to check the abuses of the
other two branches because the judiciary is not politically accountable to them. Id. at
715.
60. Full-time magistrates serve eight-year terms and part-time magistrates serve fouryear terms. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1982). Moreover, the district court may remove a
magistrate during his or her term for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability. See id. at § 631(i).
61. Although § 634(b) provides that "the salary of a full-time United States magistrate shall not be reduced, during the term in which he is serving, below the salary fixed
for him at the beginning of that term," id., Congress remains free to reduce a magistrate's
salary at any time by repealing or overruling this statutory provision. See Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 593 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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dressed the issue have included jury selection in felony cases as a delegable duty.6 3
Perhaps the strongest argument raised against delegating jury selection
in felony trials is that jury selection is not a pretrial matter, but rather an
integral part of the trial itself 4 and therefore must be presided over by an
Article III judge as an exercise of the judicial power of the United
States.65 This objection fails, however, because the Supreme Court has
held that inherently judicial tasks, entrusted to the courts by Article III,
may be delegated to magistrates as long as the district judge retains the
power to make the final determination.6 6 This power is preserved
through the district judge's ability to conduct a de novo review.6 7

Although the additional duties clause does not provide explicitly for de
novo review,68 this omission does not prevent a district judge from con63. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
64. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (jury
selection is an essential element used to preserve a defendant's constitutional right to a
jury trial), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988).
65. See id
66. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682 (1980); Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 271 (1976); see also United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 662-64 (9th Cir.
1980) (presiding over jury deliberations), cert denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
Furthermore, the argument that jury selection is an integral part of the trial is subject
to debate. Although voir dire unquestionably forms an important part of a felony trial,
see infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text, its importance does not make it so integral
to the trial that it cannot be delegated to a magistrate. See United States v. Peacock, 761
F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985); United States v. RiveraSola, 713 F.2d 866, 874 (Ist Cir. 1983). The judge need not be present for many parts of
a criminal trial. For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow depositions
taken outside of the courtroom to be offered into evidence at trial. Fed. R. Crim. P.
15(a). Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld the referral to magistrates of evidentiary
hearings on motions to suppress. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683-84
(1980). "[The resolution of a suppression motion can and often does determine the outcome of the case," id at 677-78, however, "the interests at stake in a suppression hearing
are of a lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself." .d at 679. In practice,
even before passage of the Federal Magistrates Act, the Constitution had not been
deemed to require the court to conduct voir dire. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 341
F.2d 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.) (voir dire supervised by deputy clerk), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
902 (1965).
67. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-84 (1980); Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976); United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1445 (5th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). In Weber, the
Supreme Court, in upholding a delegation under the additional duties clause, explained
"[t]he district judge is free to follow [the magistrate's recommendation] or wholly to
ignore it, or, if he is not satisfied, he may conduct the review in whole or in part anew."
423 U.S. at 271; see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 686 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) ("Congress has vested in Art. III judges the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and impartial assistants, while ensuring that the
judges retain complete supervisory control over the assistants' activities.").
68. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1982). The Act explicitly provides for de
novo review in another section. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (if any party objects to the
magistrates recommendations, "[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made"); supra note 3; infra note 76.
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ducting such a review.6 9 When he accepts a referral, the magistrate acts
under the supervision of the district judge, and the authority for making

final decisions remains with the district judge at all times.7" The district
judge retains ultimate responsibility for decision-making in every instance in which a magistrate exercises additional duties jurisdicti, .7 '
Therefore, the power to conduct de novo review resides inherently and
judge,72 and its availability satisfies the comimplicitly with the district
73
mands of Article III.
Because the district court still acts as a court of original jurisdiction,
the district judge, conducting a de novo review, must review the proceedings and make an independent determination of the controversy.74 The
type of review afforded must suffice to show that the district judge exercised his non-delegable authority to make the final determination. 75 It
need not be exercised, however, in the absence of a request. 76 The dis69. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1980); Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1976); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985).
70. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976).
71. See id.
72. See id.; United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1445 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(Rubin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988). The Federal Magistrates Act
provides that each district court shall establish rules governing the assignment of duties
to magistrates. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (1982). Therefore, where the local rules provide for de novo review of a magistrate's conduct of jury selection, the district court has
explicit power to conduct such a review. See United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659,
663-64 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981); United States v. Southern
Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 55 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
73. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1980); Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976); United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1445 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988); United States v. Bezold,
760 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986).
74. The judge, not the magistrate, makes the final determination. See Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976). Unlike an appellate review, when conducting a de novo
review, the district judge may review the facts as well as the law. See United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 690 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (" 'de novo determination'...
means an independent determination of a controversy that accords no deference to any
prior resolution of the same controversy"); United Sates v. Shami, 754 F.2d 670, 672 (6th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (de novo review provides "for a redetermination by the Court")
(quoting United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981)).
75. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 673, 683; see, e.g., Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1008-09
(10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (court must review actual transcript when defendant's objections relate specifically to actual testimony); Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir.
1986) (if magistrate summarizes conflicts adequately, court may not need to review actual
transcript); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3rd Cir. 1984) (reviewing summary of testimony is sufficient if objection made does not refer to a specific part of the proceeding);
Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1984) (court can adopt magistrate's credibility finding without rehearing live testimony).
76. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980); Delgado v. Bowen, 782
F.2d 79, 81-82 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Peacock, 761 F. 2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). Although not explicitly applying to the additional
duties clause, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides that "[w]ithin ten days after being served
with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings
and recommendations as provided by rules of court." Id.
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trict judge retains discretion to decide whether review of the magistrate's
conduct is necessary." The judge may examine all or part of the record

if he so chooses.7"

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, holds that the

lack of explicit statutory procedures requiring de novo review when hnagistrates select juries in felony cases renders such review illusory.

9

The

court reasons that access to the record of the proceedings does not give
the judge sufficient evidence upon which to determine whether the selec-

tion or rejection of a juror was proper because the juror's demeanor is
often more indicative of his real opinions than are his words.'

The type of review available over a magistrate's supervision of voir
dire satisfies Article III.81 The district judge may examine proposed
questions before voir dire begins8" as well as the complete transcript once
jury selection is finished.8 3 Moreover, the defendant can draw the district judge's attention to any possible problems with the selection procedure by raising an objection.8 4 The judge can question any or all of the
jurors himself to confirm their qualifications and assess their credibility.85
If the judge determines that a juror is not qualified, he can dismiss the
juror.86 The district judge's retention of the power to make the final de-

termination with respect to the selection of the jury satisfies the requirements of Article III by preserving the independence of the federal

judiciary.
2. The Defendant's Due Process Right
The availability of de novo review when a district judge delegates jury
selection to a magistrate also protects a defendant's procedural right to
77. See supra cases cited note 76.
78. See supra cases cited note 76.
79. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1436 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert.
denied, 108 S.CL 741 (1988).
80. Id at 1436-37. Furthermore, even if a district judge did requestion a juror, the
spontaneity of the original response would be lost. Id at 1437.
81. See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001-03 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1063 (1986); accord United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985).
82. See United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.) (district judge may
review questions prior to voir dire), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985).
83. See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1063 (1986); cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) (district judge
can sufficiently conduct a de novo review of a suppression hearing without rehearing
testimony).
84. See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1063 (1986); accord United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985).
85. See supra cases cited in note 84.
86. See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474
U.S. 1027 (1986); United State v. Jones, 696 F.2d 479, 492 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 462
U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 1027 (1982).
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access to an independent federal judiciary. 7 The fifth amendment states
that no person "shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law."8 8 Due process, however, merely guarantees a defendant the right to a hearing "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." 9 Whether this guarantee has been afforded depends upon the
circumstances. 90
Due process is a personal right belonging to the individual defendant.91 Thus, the defendant may waive any due process right if he acts
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 92 If the defendant consents to
93
having a magistrate conduct voir dire, he waives his due process right.
If, on the other hand, the defendant does not consent, Raddatz requires
courts, in determining whether delegation of jury selection in felony trials
preserves a defendant's due process right, to weigh the three factors set
forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge:94 the private interests affected; the risk that the process used will cause an erroneous deter87. See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1063 (1986); accord United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). Adjudication by an Article III judge is a personal right

belonging to defendants as well as a means of maintaining separation of powers. See
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533-36 (1962); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389, 412-13 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (1973).
88. U.S. Const. amend. V.
89. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); accord United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980).

90. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (due process does not
require evidentiary hearing before social security disability payments are terminated);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-68 (1970) (due process requires that welfare recipient be given evidentiary hearing prior to termination of benefits); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1961) (plaintiff's exclusion from naval
gun factory without being advised of grounds for exclusion and without a hearing did not
violate due process); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (when a government
agency conducts a fact-finding investigation "full panoply of judicial procedures" is not
necessary).
91. Due process offers a means of protecting an individual's inalienable rights. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. Inc.
v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
824.
92. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). In fact, the Supreme Court
has upheld a number of cases in which criminal defendants were found to have waived
fundamental rights. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 650 (1976) (privilege
against self-incrimination); Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973) (right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536
(1972) (right to a speedy trial); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (by
pleading guilty, the right to a trial itself); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-16
(1962) (the right to counsel); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (the right
to trial by jury).
93. See United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 873-74 (1st Cir. 1983); see also
United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (failure to object not reversible error), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906 (1984); cf. Haith v. United States, 342 F.2d 158,
159 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (judge's absence from courtroom during jury selection
does not violate defendant's due process right when defendant does not object); Stirone v.
United State, 341 F.2d 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.), (same), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965).
94. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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mination and the probable value that any added procedural safeguards
would accord; and the public and governmental interests." Application
of this analysis shows that delegation of jury selection in a felony case to
a magistrate does not violate a defendant's due process right.9 6
The private interest affected when a district judge delegates jury selection to a magistrate is extremely important.97 The jury that is chosen
ultimately decides the defendant's guilt or innocence. Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that "[d]ue process means a jury capable and willing to
decide the case solely on the evidence before it."9 8 To uphold the defendant's interest, a magistrate must ensure that the jury selected is impartial
and competent. 99
Having a magistrate, instead of an Article III judge, conduct voir dire
results in only a negligible risk that an erroneous determination will occur because all of the magistrate's actions are subject to de novo review
by an Article III judge." ° Furthermore, having a magistrate preside
over jury selection provides greater procedural safeguards than having a
district judge alone preside: when a magistrate conducts jury selection, a
chance for reconsideration by the district judge always exists, whereas
when a district judge presides, only one evaluation occurs.' 0 '
95. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1507
(I lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (applying Weber to magistrate's conduct of habeas corpus

petition hearing). In Raddatz, the respondent contended that the guarantees of due process include a "'hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Relying on this guarantee, the defendant argued that "'[t]he

one who decides must hear.'" Raddatz 447 U.S. at 677 (quoting Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936)).
96. See United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 847 (1985); United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001-03 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 872-74 (1st Cir.

1983).
97. The jury right exists to protect those accused of a crime from arbitrary abuses of

power. See Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2056-57 (1987); Batson v. Kentucky,
106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717 (1986). A defendant, therefore, has a constitutional right to an
impartial jury. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985). To uphold this right,
the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor no longer may use peremptory challenges
to exclude jurors on the basis of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88
(1986).
98. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
99. Cf Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912) (to ensure due process
guarantee of a meaningful hearing, jury must be impartial and mentally competent).
100. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1446 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Rubin,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 741 (1988); United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999,
1002 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986); United States v. Peacock, 761
F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). Because the de novo review

available to a district judge over a magistrate's conduct of jury selection satisfies the requirements of Article III, see supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text, it follows implicitly that the de novo review available also suffices to protect a defendant's procedural due
process right to access to an independent federal judiciary.
101. See Bezold, 760 F.2d at 1002; cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 684-85

(1980) (Blackmun, J. concurring) (when a magistrate conducts a suppression hearing,
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Moreover, it is in the public interest to allow district judges to delegate
' 2 The legislative history surrounding
voir dire to magistrates. 10
the Federal Magistrates Act indicates that Congress intended to increase the efficiency of the federal judicial system.103 Allowing district judges to
delegate jury selection to magistrates gives them more time to preside
over actual trials, thereby improving the efficiency of their courts ' 04 at no
cost to the defendant's rights.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act in an attempt to alleviate the growing caseload of the district courts. Although the Act does
not specifically mention presiding over jury selection in felony cases as
one of the duties that a district judge may assign to a magistrate, delegation of this responsibility under the additional duties clause comports
with congressional intent. Furthermore, delegation of jury selection
neither infringes upon the separation of powers implicit in Article III nor
violates a defendant's procedural due process right to access to an independent federal judiciary because de novo review by an Article III
judge is always available.
Maria Eisland
defendant is provided with double protection because the issue in question is reviewed by
two neutral decision makers, not just one).
102. H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 6162, 6167-68.
103. Id. at 6171.
104. See United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 847 (1985); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir. 1983).

